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This year the United States Senate will be asked for its advice and 
consent on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Since Physics 
cwJ Society has already had several papers [I] on the CTBT, I will con­
fine this paper to the single issue of "how much reliability and yield is 
lI&lCeSS8ry to maintain a vibrant deterrent for a strong national security." 
Rather than give descriptive arguments, this paper will be confined to a 
sensitivity analysis of some parameters. It is important to carry out such 
an anal~because those who will oppose ratification will raise the spec­
tel' ~ declining yields and reduced reliabilities of nuclear weapons. 
uctions in yield and reliability would make rather 
the probability of destroying the taraet] in the 
mode, one should not conclude that these war· 
1rithout considering the mission of the weapons. 
Since the U.S. and Russia have conducted 85 percent of the nuclear 
tests, one would expect that these two nations have an advantage over the 
other nations on the physics of nuclear explosions. Now that Russia's 
nuclear infrastructure is collapsing, the U.S. will retain a large lead in 
testing knowledge from its 1000 tests. Under START 11, the U.S. will 
retain 10,000 warheads with 3500 of them deployed for strategic use and 
another 1000 for a somewhat slower response. These forces are 
considerable and stable with respect to the unlikely possibility of a 
worst-case attack by Russia. 
Some of the unanimous conclusions from the JASON study on nuclear 
testing [2] by 14 prominent scientists, including four DOE weapon 
designers, are as follows: The JASON group concluded that they have a 
high confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance margins of the 
present U.S. nuclear stockpile which will continue to be needed for 
deterrence. In addition they concluded that the U.S. can maintain the 
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quality of its nuclear weapons with the Science-Based Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management Program which does not include nuclear 
testing. The group concluded that the range of performance margins of 
the weapons are adequate at this time and that past problems were 
primarily the result of incomplete or inadequate design activities. The 
JASON group is convinced that those problems have been corrected and 
that the weapon types in the enduring stockpile are safe and reliable in 
the context of explicit military requirements. 
DOE's definition of reliability is concerned with the "ability of an item 
to perform a required function .... implicit in the above definition of 'abil­
ity' is the concept of successful performance. Successful performangt for 
nuclear weapons is defined as detonation at the desired yield (or hiJher) 
at the target. ..." A strict reading of this definition requires the verdict of 
"unreliable" for a Trident II D5 W88 warhead which had a yield of 428 
kilotons, 10% below the reported design yield of 475 kilotons. Since 
modest reductions in yield and reliability would make rather minor re­
ductions in the two-warhead-attack mode, one should not conclude that 
these warheads are unreliable without considering the mission of the 
weapons. 
Variations in Yield: The JASON group, the DOE laboratory 
directors, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the stock pile as 
reliable and safe. Nevertheless, how important would a reduction in yield 
be? In order to answer this question, we can estimate the probability that 
a warhead can destroy a target, Pk with the approximate formula [3]; 
I 
P b R [ I - (1/2)-(E Y / CEP' H)'/3 ]
k 
(Eq. I) 
where Y is the yield in megatons, H is the target hardness in psi, CEP is the circular error 
probable accuracy in nautical miles and R is the fractional reliability. The constant E has 
a value of 16.4 nmi3psi/Mt. The probability of kill for multiple warheads against a target is 
(Eq. 2)
 
The following parameters [4] can be used to describe U.S. systems:
 
Yield Accuracy (CEP) 
PK (MX) 0.3 Mtons 0.05 nautical miles 
Trident D5 0.475 Mtons 0.06 nautical miles 
MMIII 0.335 Mtons, 0.12 nautical miles (CEP to be 
improved) 
The reliability is assumed [5} to be 90%. For the case of very hard 
targets of 5000 psi, a very large reduction of 50% in yield reduces P/2) 
for Trident D5 from 97.3% to 92.6% and for the Peacekeeper from 97.6% 
to 93.5%, or a reduction of only 4.5%. For the case of hardened silos of 
2000 psi, Trident Pk(2) is reduced from 98.9% to 98.0% and for the MX 
from 98.4% to 98.2%, for an average reduction of 0.5%. From these 
results it is clear that very large reductions in the performance yield are 
not critical. Using values of H = 5000 psi for very hard targets and R = 
0.9, we obtain Fig. I which gives the probability of kill for two warheads 
on a silo, P/2), as a function of the fraction of full yield. We note that this 
curve is only slightly changed for 50% reductions in yield for our two 
most potent systems, the Peacekeeper and Trident 05 W88. 
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Fig. I. The two-shot kill probability vs. the fractional performance yield of three 
U.S. systems. (H = 5000 psi, R = 0.9) 
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Reduced Reliability: The reduction in kill probability from reduced 
reliability of two warheads attacking a hard target can be estimated in a 
similar fashion. For a 20% reduction in the assumed reliability of 90% 
against the 5000 psi silos, the Pk(2) kill probability for the Trident is 
reduced from 97% to 89%, and for the Peacekeeper it is reduced from 
98% to 89%, for an average reduction of 8%. A vast reduction of 50% in 
reliability reduces the kill probabilities by 32%. The Pp) kill probabil­
ity as a function of the fractional reliability is plotted in Figure 2. 
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Fig.2. The two-shot kill probability Pk(2) vs. the fraction of assumed reliability. 
(H = 5000 psi, R = 0.9) 
Conclusion: On February 7, 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
and Acting Secretary of Energy Charles Curtis delivered the annual Nuclear 
Stockpile Certification: 
"In response to Presidential direction to conduct an annual certifica­
tion of the nuclear weapons stockpile, we have thoroughly reviewed the 
stockpile and judge it to be safe and reliable. There is no need to conduct 
an underground test at this time. Problems that have arisen in the 
stockpile, for example as a result of aging components, are being 
addressed to assure the stockpile remains safe and reliable. These 
current problems can be resolved without nuclear testing. In reaching 
this conclusion, we have obtained the advice of the Directors of DOE's 
Nuclear Weapons Laboratories, the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic 
Command, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Nuclear 
Weapons Council." 
The annual certification process involved calculations and 
considerations much beyond the estimates given here. However, some of 
the concepts of this paper must have been part of the certification process. 
Because the mission must be considered along with the properties of the 
warhead, it is necessary that both the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, 
acting together, made the certification. If this were not the case, the 
Secretary of Energy could claim problems with reliability or yield that 
did not meaningfully affect the mission. As a reality check, we should 
remember that deterrence is a psychological concept based on the 
perceptions of other countries that our systems indeed are reliable and 
have considerable yield. The message of this paper is that the mission for 
the weapons must be considered along with the performance status of the 
warheads, and the U.S. has a considerable excess of survivable yield and 
reliability for the prescribed missions. 
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